National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)

The committee scrutinised the UK’s approach to securing undersea cables, focusing on deterrence, resilience, governance and capacity to respond to disruption. Ministers outlined a continuing, multi-lateral deterrence posture, progress on the Atlantic Bastion concept (uncrewed systems; 2026–2029 timelines) and the development of a UK-flagged repair capability (medium term). They also set out plans for sovereign repair capability options, emergency repair plans from landing-station operators by year-end, and ongoing engagement with industry and the finance sector. An Oversight Board for undersea infrastructure has been established, meets quarterly, and serves as a policy forum rather than crisis management, with public updates to follow later in the year. The session also surfaced risks around insurance, international-law considerations (UNCLOS), potential cable clustering, and the evolving role of private sector ownership in global cables, alongside a push for broader public engagement on risk messaging.

This session of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy scrutinised the government’s proposed national conversation on societal resilience. Witnesses urged urgent public engagement and a coherent national narrative about threats (notably cyberattacks and critical-national infrastructure risks), emphasising cross‑departmental and public‑private collaboration and a whole‑country approach. They debated financing options for defence (including bonds and levies), regional devolution of planning, and the role of civil society and academia. They warned that delaying a national conversation risks strategic surprise and argued for a two‑year public‑outreach programme and multi‑actor engagement to sustain consent for defence decisions across multiple Parliaments.

The session scrutinised how two governments approach societal resilience and public engagement in the face of systemic risks. Taiwan outlined its whole-of-society resilience framework, six core elements, and a formal commitment to provide the exact GDP share spent on resilience. The Netherlands described a whole-of-government/society campaign (Think Ahead), cross-party support for defence- and resilience-spending ambitions, and a decentralised safety-region model that delegates crisis coordination to regional authorities while detailing funding and escalation mechanisms. Together, the witnesses highlighted public-information strategies, civil-society collaboration to counter disinformation, and the political dynamics (including electoral cycles) that affect resilience policy. Key commitments include: Taiwan will write with the exact GDP percentage devoted to resilience; the Netherlands will sustain a long-term resilience campaign with predefined benchmarks and maintain cross-party backing; and both cases emphasise public awareness and multi-stakeholder exercises as central to resilience. Policy signals include: a) explicit GDP-spend disclosure on resilience by Taiwan; b) a Dutch “Think Ahead” public-information campaign with multi-language materials and periodic re-launches; c) the Netherlands’ declared defence-plus-society spending trajectory (3.5% by 2035) and social-funding trade-offs; d) a decentralised Dutch regional-crisis architecture (safety regions) with central coordination for national crises; e) active counter-disinformation mechanisms involving government, civil-society, and platforms; f) ongoing cross-border cooperation with the UK on resilience and critical infrastructure (e.g., subsea cables).

This session scrutinised how the National Security Strategy (NSS) is governed, funded, and delivered across government, with a focus on defence spending trajectories, resilience funding, and cross-department accountability. Key government commitments include publishing a refreshed national cyber action plan in spring 2026; co-ordinating a joint national-security bid into the spending review (SR25) to support 3% GDP defence targets and 1.5% resilience spend by 2027, alongside a broader 5% GDP resilience framework by the 2030s; and providing detail on how resources will translate into capabilities. The witnesses emphasised NSC-led governance, cross-department delivery, ongoing work with allies (NATO/Five Eyes), and cross-cutting tools such as the Defending Democracy Taskforce (DDTF) and the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS). The committee pressed for greater public-facing information on resilience, a deeper breakdown of resilience spending (civil vs military, climate vs hybrid threats), and closer scrutiny of national sovereignty and strategic tech priorities (including the Sovereign AI Unit). Notable topics included China policy, US-UK relations, cyber-security legislation, and the need to move from rhetoric to tangible, near-term capability. Key government positions include a continued emphasis on NATO alliances, a commitment to publish and refine cyber and resilience policies, and a warning against derisking from the US while pursuing closer European collaboration.

The session scrutinised how political finance interacts with foreign influence and how crypto and other funding channels could threaten democratic integrity. Witnesses stressed the need for stronger regulation of crypto, safer provenance and source-of-funds tracking, and better governance to manage risks. There was broad agreement among witnesses that regulation should bring crypto donations into a regulated space, with advocates for caps on donations and limited ways to obfuscate funding. Several witnesses called for improved data-sharing and collaboration between public authorities and the private sector, while others highlighted enforcement challenges and the limitations of current capabilities. The committee considered the Elections Bill as a potential vehicle to address these gaps, but no explicit government commitments were made during the session. A moratorium on crypto donations until robust controls are in place was proposed by some witnesses, with others urging a nuanced, phased approach that preserves legitimate participation in political finance while reducing risk.

This session interrogated Pillar 3 of the National Security Strategy, focusing on sovereign capabilities and asymmetric challenges. Witnesses argued the pillar is underdeveloped and requires tighter framework, clearer definitions, and stronger analytic capacity, including horizon-scanning and data governance. They pressed for data to be treated as infrastructure, a living list of sovereign capabilities, and greater cross-government, industry, and academic collaboration. The discussion also covered funding (NSSIF), defence procurement speed, and the need for a whole-nation approach to resilience, plus lessons from Ukraine and international partnerships (notably AUKUS) to accelerate capability delivery while avoiding bureaucratic drag. Crucial concrete points included calls for a scenario-based baseline for sovereignty, a revived data ecosystem (including health data and OpenSAFELY), faster procurement pathways, and a governance model that integrates regulators, academia, and industry.