Defence & Security
47mentions · last 12 months↓
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This joint committee of both Houses scrutinises the delivery and implementation of the UK's National Security Strategy across all four pillars. It operates as a select committee in the Lords and takes oral evidence from government officials, security experts, and international witnesses. The committee has conducted sustained inquiry into the government's progress on NSS Pillar 1 (Resilience and Readiness), Pillar 2 (Nuclear deterrence), and Pillar 3 (Sovereign Capabilities), examining whether policy intentions translate into funded and resilient delivery mechanisms. Recent sessions have focused on China policy and security threats, with particular attention to espionage risks highlighted in evidence from Lords Hermer and Jones on Official Secrets Act enforcement. The committee has also widened its gaze to international dimensions, comparing societal resilience approaches in Taiwan and the Netherlands, and explored emerging threats to democratic integrity including cryptocurrency's role in political finance. Its work reflects concern that strategic commitments require sustained investment and institutional preparedness across civilian and defence sectors.
15 sessions published in the last 12 months · busiest week: w/c 27 Oct (2 sessions)
Click any cell in the heatmap to see the sessions held that day and the insights extracted from them.
171 insights
13 Jul 2026
The committee scrutinised how NATO deterrence is changing under Russian aggression and possible US retrenchment. Witnesses argued that Europe must assume more responsibility for conventional defence, but stressed that US enablers, intelligence sharing and command-and-control remain hard to replace. They warned that NATO’s investment plans lack clear force-structure detail, that Europe is still short of critical capabilities, and that readiness, mobility, cyber resilience and industrial capacity are as important as headline spending. On Ukraine, witnesses said NATO itself has limited leverage on negotiations, with sanctions, economic pressure and diplomacy doing more of the work, while any ceasefire peacekeeping force would be weak without US air and missile defence. They also pressed for better public communication in the UK about defence spending and for stronger UK leadership in shaping a more European NATO.
22 Jun 2026
The committee scrutinised whether EU defence integration can deliver real deterrence against Russia, and how far the UK should align with EU partners after Brexit. Witnesses argued the EU remains structurally constrained, the UK-EU security partnership is useful but mostly dialogic, and deeper co-operation is limited by single-market politics and mutual suspicion. The second panel focused on sanctions and economic statecraft: witnesses said sanctions have imposed major costs on Russia but have not changed Putin’s calculus, criticised the UK and EU for not acting more boldly after 2014, and argued that mainstreaming illicit-finance intelligence and using frozen Russian assets remain mainly questions of political will rather than law.
15 Jun 2026
The Committee scrutinised how Russia perceives the UK, why its security services are more aggressive and militarised, and how Moscow’s informal decision-making and elite repression shape escalation risk. Witnesses argued the UK is a disproportionately significant target because of its intelligence role, support for Russian dissidents, and perceived influence over the US, while also warning that Russian grey-zone activity risks inadvertent escalation rather than immediate conventional war. On deterrence, the witnesses broadly said attribution and rhetoric are insufficient without credible capability, allied doctrine, readiness, sanctions enforcement, and conventional and nuclear strike options. They also argued the UK should prioritise readiness and missile capability over hollow stockpiles, keep sanctions pressure up, and avoid a “fortress Britain” mindset in favour of allied, global deterrence and soft power.
18 May 2026
The committee scrutinised the UK’s approach to securing undersea cables, focusing on deterrence, resilience, governance and capacity to respond to disruption. Ministers outlined a continuing, multi-lateral deterrence posture, progress on the Atlantic Bastion concept (uncrewed systems; 2026–2029 timelines) and the development of a UK-flagged repair capability (medium term). They also set out plans for sovereign repair capability options, emergency repair plans from landing-station operators by year-end, and ongoing engagement with industry and the finance sector. An Oversight Board for undersea infrastructure has been established, meets quarterly, and serves as a policy forum rather than crisis management, with public updates to follow later in the year. The session also surfaced risks around insurance, international-law considerations (UNCLOS), potential cable clustering, and the evolving role of private sector ownership in global cables, alongside a push for broader public engagement on risk messaging.
27 Apr 2026
This session of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy scrutinised the government’s proposed national conversation on societal resilience. Witnesses urged urgent public engagement and a coherent national narrative about threats (notably cyberattacks and critical-national infrastructure risks), emphasising cross‑departmental and public‑private collaboration and a whole‑country approach. They debated financing options for defence (including bonds and levies), regional devolution of planning, and the role of civil society and academia. They warned that delaying a national conversation risks strategic surprise and argued for a two‑year public‑outreach programme and multi‑actor engagement to sustain consent for defence decisions across multiple Parliaments.
20 Apr 2026
The session scrutinised how two governments approach societal resilience and public engagement in the face of systemic risks. Taiwan outlined its whole-of-society resilience framework, six core elements, and a formal commitment to provide the exact GDP share spent on resilience. The Netherlands described a whole-of-government/society campaign (Think Ahead), cross-party support for defence- and resilience-spending ambitions, and a decentralised safety-region model that delegates crisis coordination to regional authorities while detailing funding and escalation mechanisms. Together, the witnesses highlighted public-information strategies, civil-society collaboration to counter disinformation, and the political dynamics (including electoral cycles) that affect resilience policy. Key commitments include: Taiwan will write with the exact GDP percentage devoted to resilience; the Netherlands will sustain a long-term resilience campaign with predefined benchmarks and maintain cross-party backing; and both cases emphasise public awareness and multi-stakeholder exercises as central to resilience. Policy signals include: a) explicit GDP-spend disclosure on resilience by Taiwan; b) a Dutch “Think Ahead” public-information campaign with multi-language materials and periodic re-launches; c) the Netherlands’ declared defence-plus-society spending trajectory (3.5% by 2035) and social-funding trade-offs; d) a decentralised Dutch regional-crisis architecture (safety regions) with central coordination for national crises; e) active counter-disinformation mechanisms involving government, civil-society, and platforms; f) ongoing cross-border cooperation with the UK on resilience and critical infrastructure (e.g., subsea cables).
18 May 2026
18 May 2026