Speaker's Conference (2024)

The committee scrutinised the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology on the Online Safety Act (OS Act) implementation, enforcement powers, and how Ofcom will regulate platforms. Witnesses Kanishka Narayan and Talitha Rowland described the Act as broadly enabling robust investigation and enforcement, highlighted resource and tech-enabled enforcement considerations, and acknowledged complexity in balancing illegal harms with free expression in the legal-but-harmful space. They outlined phase- and design-based approaches (including phase 3 enforcement of terms of service, and technology-neutral, iterative regulation), and stressed child-protection priorities. The inquiry covered parliamentary scrutiny, potential tools for elected officials to manage online interaction, and ongoing monitoring of VPN circumvention. The session reflected government intent to strengthen enforcement, maintain human-centred regulation grounded in British values, and iterate regulatory codes as technology evolves.

The session scrutinised Ofcom’s interpretation and implementation of the Online Safety Act with a focus on protecting MPs, candidates and the political process. Witnesses outlined progress and remaining gaps in enforcement, risk-management, and transparency, and discussed the resources and powers Ofcom believes necessary to drive change. Key points included: five priority aims for platforms (governance of risk, child sexual abuse material, age checks, rapid illegal-content removal, and algorithmic harms to children); the accumulation of around 70 risk assessments; the potential use of court-measures for non-compliance; thresholds for deeming content illegal without requiring mental-state evidence; emphasis on platforms building robust content-moderation systems rather than regulator-opining on individual items; a focus on safety for MPs and women, including guidance on prohibiting and addressing hateful content; upcoming category-1 duties including adult-tools for filtering content and user-identity controls; development of a broader transparency regime with categorisation and real-time information requests under section 100; ongoing debate about proportionality, international pressures, and the balance between safety and free expression; phase-3 policy development (ID-verification and empowerment tools) slated for consultation next year; and the potential for a future data-access regime to support researchers. Government commitments are primarily via Ofcom’s stated plans, such as publishing risk-insight reports, final guidance to services by year-end, and consulting on phase-3 measures next year.

The session scrutinises how social media platforms X (formerly Twitter) and Meta (Facebook/Instagram) frame their roles in UK politics, with a focus on elections, online abuse of MPs, and platform safety measures. Witnesses outline ongoing moderation practices, dedicated election safeguards, and data-sharing practices with regulators and law enforcement, alongside calls for greater data access for independent researchers. MPs raise concerns about abuse towards Members of Parliament, perceived changes in enforcement post-ownership changes, and questions about the credibility criteria used to remove threats. The committee traces the regulatory framing around the Online Safety Act (OSA) 2023, the role of SIRAS as an escalation channel, and asks for written follow-ups on specific data requests to Parliament, while observers from academia warn about algorithmic amplification, platform transparency, and the need for systemic regulation to protect vulnerable groups and ensure accountability.

The committee scrutinised the case for centralising investigations and prosecutions involving MPs, parliamentary staff, and candidates during elections. Evidence from policing and prosecutorial bodies described existing centralised structures (Parliamentary Liaison and Investigation Team; Operation Bridger; Operation Ford) and argued that further centralisation could improve consistency, with modest resource needs and ongoing policy work (including a Home Office White Paper). The CPS outlined its national framework and central casework divisions, emphasizing oversight, consistency, and case progression. The witnesses also examined protective and sanctioning tools (non-harassment orders, restraining orders, disqualification orders), speeding up prosecutions during elections, data gaps on MP/victim cases, and the treatment of aggravating factors such as offences against MPs or staff. Ministers and parliamentary officials discussed ongoing legal and policy considerations, including the Law Commission’s recommendations on misogyny and hate-crime provisions, and the potential for automatic or case-by-case use of orders. Several witnesses urged balancing central expertise with local community knowledge and called for written submissions and data collection to inform policy development.

The session scrutinised the scale and impact of abuse and intimidation directed at MPs and journalists, the role of social media in propagating toxicity, and the balance between robust political discourse and harassment. Witnesses outlined behavioural drivers of online abuse, potential regulatory and educational responses, and pragmatic strategies to rebuild public trust. Key government commitments or positions include calls for stronger citizenship education to bolster democratic norms, and leveraging the Online Safety Act 2023 to curb abusive online content. Panelists proposed targeted public education campaigns, evidence-informed classroom interventions (Roots and Deliberative Classroom), and better engagement with anti-disinformation efforts. Overall, the committee heard that addressing abuse requires a multi-pronged approach spanning education, media accountability, platform governance, and civic renewal initiatives, with explicit calls to statutory curriculum reform and enhanced moderation/education responsibilities for tech platforms.

The session scrutinised how the Defending Democracy Taskforce (DDTF) and Joint Election Security and Preparedness Unit (JESP) coordinate across Government to protect MPs, candidates and elections, and the resources and practices deployed during election periods. Witnesses outlined cross-government leadership (DDTF), dedicated protective security funding for elected officials, and the shift of security responsibility from Parliament to Government during elections. They also reported on pre-election security activity, the Bridger/Ford policing networks, and efforts to improve guidance and engagement with candidates. Key government commitments included renewed DDTF mandate, funding to protect elected officials, continued cross-Government coordination via JESP, and plans to improve guidance, awareness, and enforcement of electoral-law tools. Policy concerns raised included high levels of harassment and intimidation in the 2024 election, gaps in enforcement and awareness of legal protections, inconsistent policing responses, and procedural weaknesses in candidate nomination, vetting, and identity checks. The session signalled potential legislative and practical updates (law refinement, enforcement clarity, data capture) and reinforced the need for centralised policing leadership, more comprehensive candidate outreach, and safeguards for local elections.