UK Engagement with Space Committee

The Lords committee examined UNOOSA's view of space governance, focusing on three core challenges: global space traffic coordination, active debris removal, and the implementation of space law. UNOOSA emphasised the need for a global mechanism to coordinate traffic and avoid collisions, highlighted the importance of debris-removal actions (noting Japan as an example) and the role of national implementation of non-binding norms (such as long-term sustainability guidelines). The witness urged UK leadership, greater industry-collaboration, and proactive engagement with COPUOS to shape international norms, standards, and future summits (notably the 2027 UNISPACE COPUOS milestones). The session also explored how emerging space powers can be engaged, the potential for UK-hosted payload hosting, and the importance of a predictable regulatory pathway to balance sustainability with industry competitiveness. Key government commitments are forward-looking (e.g., planning for a 2027 space-sustainability agenda under UN guidance) and contingent on national leadership and international collaboration; no binding UK government legislation was announced in evidence.

The session scrutinises UK space policy, funding and governance, focusing on how the National Space Strategy is being delivered, the balance between national programmes and ESA participation, and the prospect of a sovereign space capability. Witnesses emphasise a perceived shift towards a one-government approach to space, call for clearer funding and prioritisation (five capabilities + launch), and discuss the role of procurement, front-doors to government, and the importance of building a space-related skills pipeline. They also flag concerns about under-investment relative to peers, the potential tension with EU/ESA dynamics, and the need for a strategic capability plan to sustain long-term space technology development. Government commitments or positions extracted include signs of optimism about a more coherent cross-departmental space approach and a need for phased funding aligned with capabilities and launch plans.

The UK Space engagement session scrutinised how DSIT intends to streamline the national space strategy, balance EU/ESA cooperation with sovereign UK capability, and mobilise cross-government delivery. Key government positions included: prioritising three strategic aims (national security, economic growth, and exploiting UK competencies such as launch and earth observation); pursuing a one-government approach to space with formal governance structures; and sustaining significant ESA collaboration while developing sovereign capacity. The session also explored funding mechanisms (Industrial Strategy and bilateral channels), procurement vs grant funding, international collaboration (Galileo/IRIS²), skills investment, immigration controls for space talent, and the evolving launch ecosystem (Shetland, SaxaVord, and potential clusters). Net commitments or stated positions include considering Galileo renewal in 2027, continuing an outcomes-first allocation approach, and maintaining a focus on space debris governance and global partnerships.

The inquiry scrutinises how space-derived data and technologies bolster non-space sectors (notably agriculture and shipping), how government policy and procurement shape private sector uptake, and the case for a UK sovereign launch capability versus reliance on ESA/European arrangements. Witnesses from techUK, Maersk, and academia describe widespread use of satellite data in agriculture (including Sentinel-2 earth observation and field-boundary automation), critical dependence of shipping on satellite connectivity for navigation, welfare, and cargo monitoring, and rising concerns about cyber resilience and GNSS vulnerability. The session also explores government roles in raising awareness, funding translational R&D and environmental monitoring, and the need for systemic, cross-sector approaches to demand. The launch-panel witnesses argue for a sovereign launch capability, sustained state backing, anchor customers (e.g., MoD), and a more focused, long-term UK launch-strategy, while emphasising ESA collaboration as complementary. Overall, commitments discussed include stronger procurement leverage by government, greater public-private collaboration, and prioritising sustained investment to grow downstream space-enabled applications domestically and in defence.

The 16 Jun 2025 UK Engagement with Space sessions examined how UK universities contribute to the space sector, the health of space research, funding fragmentation, and the growing needs for space skills. Witnesses highlighted strong university networks and industry collaboration via the Space Partnership, but warned that short-term and multi-source funding creates budgeting gaps, with insufficient join-up across UKRI, STFC, UK Space Agency, and Research England. They urged clearer prioritisation through government–industry–academia dialogue, stronger leadership for skills and workforce planning (including a potential Space Skills Task Force), and measures to strengthen the domestic pipeline, re-skill and re-train mid-career professionals, and retain international talent with a more nuanced visa regime. Commitments cited include anticipated delivery plans for space priorities by the end of 2025 and ongoing cross-Whitehall work under the Space Industrial Plan to coordinate capabilities. The sessions also flagged housing/geography constraints for space workers, the importance of diverse career pathways beyond STEM, and the need to promote a broader image of space careers beyond astronauts and satellites.

This session scrutinised the United Kingdom’s space policy stance in relation to the European Space Agency (ESA), the EU’s space programmes, and transatlantic cooperation. Witnesses stressed that ESA is separate from the EU, with the UK as a major ESA contributor and host to ECSAT, while noting Brexit-induced challenges such as the UK’s loss of access to EU space contracts like Galileo. The discussion covered UK ministerial priorities within ESA, the ministerial cycle for funding, and the potential for the UK to diversify partnerships (e.g., with Japan, India, Canada) beyond ESA for civil space and defence space collaboration. Participants flagged potential pathways to engage with EU programmes (notably IRIS²) through UK-EU negotiations and highlighted the need for space diplomacy and coordination at the European level. The session also addressed strategic dependencies on the US, including concerns about SpaceX’s dominance and the case for diversification or autonomous sovereign capabilities (e.g., autonomous PNT). Questions on EU space law emphasised unsettled timelines and enforceability challenges. Overall, the evidence outlines a UK posture that seeks to balance ESA engagement with broader diversification, while acknowledging governance challenges and the rapidly evolving geopolitical space landscape.