COMMONS
This Commons select sub-committee examines the UK's critical minerals strategy, trade sanctions regimes, arms export licensing, and economic security threats including cyber-attacks. It operates as a specialist inquiry panel taking oral evidence from government officials, industry experts, and other witnesses across its designated policy areas. The sub-committee has recently scrutinised the government's approach to critical minerals procurement and supply chain resilience, exploring vulnerabilities in UK access to essential materials. It has also investigated end-use controls within the UK's trade sanctions framework to prevent prohibited end-users circumventing restrictions. The sub-committee conducted focused inquiry into arms exports to Israel, examining humanitarian law compliance and the F-35 carve-out arrangements. In parallel, it has examined how the National Security and Investment Act operates alongside broader trade policy to protect economic security against state and non-state threats, including detailed investigation of cyber-attack risks to UK economic infrastructure.
5 sessions published in the last 12 months
Click any cell in the heatmap to see the sessions held that day and the insights extracted from them.
79 insights
15 Jul 2026
The Committee scrutinised export-control transparency, Crown exemptions, Israel-related licensing, Sudan/UAE diversion risks, and the planned internal review of licensing processes. Ministers committed to publish actual export usage and delivery data for Q1 2027, said DBT and FCDO are working on a detailed plan for a comprehensive ban on goods and services linked to illegal Israeli settlements, and promised a joint letter explaining how UK licensing criteria 1 and 6 are being applied to UAE/Sudan issues. The witnesses also defended current safeguards on diversion risk, set out the continued role of the IHL assessment cell, and confirmed a forthcoming review of export-control processes with draft terms of reference to be shared with the Committee.
20 May 2026
The Committee scrutinised the UK’s critical minerals strategy with miners, processors, financiers, industry groups and the Minister for Industry. Key themes were whether the UK can realistically meet future lithium and other minerals demand; how to speed up planning and Environment Agency permitting; how high energy costs and financing gaps are blocking projects; and whether the UK should prioritise domestic midstream processing, recycling and vertically integrated supply chains. Witnesses and the Minister broadly agreed that China’s dominance in processing is the central vulnerability, but differed on the extent to which government should intervene in commodity markets versus using offtake agreements, public finance, and international partnerships. The Minister confirmed around £268 million of allocated support, said an announcement on the £50 million early-stage funding pot was imminent, and set out a hierarchy of priorities: UK processing where possible, then bilateral and multilateral partnerships with G7, EU, Canada, Australia and other trusted partners.
22 Apr 2026
Across three panels, MPs/Peers grilled witnesses on the UK’s critical minerals strategy, focusing on how critical minerals are defined, how the UK identifies and tracks supply risk, and how to derisk reliance on China. Key themes included: the objective methodology used to designate critical minerals and its evolution; the role of international partnerships (MSP/FORGE) and the need for better, targeted international collaboration; the under-investment in midstream processing and refining in the UK; the vulnerability of supply chains due to geographic concentration and energy costs; the scale of funding required to build resilient supply chains (far beyond current £50m allocations); and the case for diplomacy, friend-shoring, recycling, and greater government funding to diversify supply chains. Insights highlight government-facing financial gaps, strategic dependence on China, and proposed avenues such as increased funding, targeted international partnerships, and a more integrated UK approach across government departments and with allies.
25 Feb 2026
The Business and Trade Sub-Committee’s session scrutinised the UK's trade sanctions regime, focusing on end-use controls, the overlap and reach of the common high priority list, enforcement architecture (OTS I, HMRC, OFSI), and cross-government coordination. Witnesses outlined planned legislation to implement sanctions end-use controls, the sequencing of sanctions packages (including Transneft) and the need for timely licensing decisions, enforcement challenges and the potential for greater transparency around compound settlements, and ongoing work on crypto-related evasion and beneficial ownership transparency in Crown dependencies and overseas territories. The committee pressed for faster action on oil derivatives, sought clarity on the enforcement model for CHPL items, and urged consideration of a ban on goods from Occupied Palestinian Territories. Overall, government commitments cited include bringing end-use controls legislation in the current session and closer international coordination, with ongoing reviews of enforcement and transparency mechanisms as priority workstreams.
15 Sept 2025
This evidence session scrutinised the UK’s export-licensing regime for Israel, focusing on whether extant licences could enable human-rights abuses in Gaza and how UK arms-export policy engages with IHL and the Genocide Convention. Key government positions included: (a) the licensing system operates globally and is not bespoke to Israel; (b) 55 end-use licences are active for Israel (9 specifically linked to the F-35 programme) with a broader set of licences involving re-exports; (c) licences are kept under continual review with regular (roughly 6–8 week) IHL assessments, and the government has suspended licences where appropriate; (d) the F-35 carve-out is defended as a balancing exercise under Article 7 of the Arms Trade Treaty, though this interpretation is contested in court; (e) the government emphasises the difficulty of grounding the F-35 fleet unilaterally due to the global nature of the programme and the need for consensus among eight partner nations; (f) hosts hostage-rescue surveillance flights from RAF Akrotiri, which are unarmed and limited to hostage-rescue data; and (g) there is ongoing political tension with allies (e.g., Spain’s genocide remark) and ongoing debate about recognizing a Palestinian state and its implications for arms-control obligations.
09 Jul 2025
This session scrutinised the UK’s approach to economic security, including the National Security and Investment Act (NSIA), sovereign capabilities, and the integration of security with trade policy. Witnesses outlined an agile, alliance-focused strategy, highlighted the need for sovereign onshore capabilities alongside deep domestic strengths (research, universities), and stressed better public-private interfaces (via the Economic Security Advisory Service) to support businesses, especially SMEs. government commitments announced or reinforced included a 12-week public consultation on updating the 17 sensitive areas, establishment of a supply-chain centre and the Economic Security Advisory Service, and scheduled national resilience exercises (national alert test on 2025-09-07 and Pegasus pandemic exercise). The committee explored human-rights considerations in trade deals, sanctions enforcement (including end-use assurances for arms licenses), cross-Government coordination, and how to balance investment, growth, and security in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment.
15 Jul 2026