Defence & Security
27mentions · last 12 months↓
View full analysis →Peers on this House of Lords select committee scrutinise the government's approach to national resilience across critical infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and systemic risks. The committee takes oral evidence from government officials, private sector representatives, and expert witnesses during formal sessions held in the Lords chamber. It produces detailed inquiry reports that feed into parliamentary debate and policy development. Recent sessions have examined the role of media and civil emergency response systems, explored the intersection of cyber security and artificial intelligence threats to national infrastructure, and assessed how the private sector and the National Audit Office contribute to resilience planning. The committee has also studied Nordic approaches to national resilience, drawing lessons from international comparators to inform UK strategy.
12 sessions published in the last 12 months
Click any cell in the heatmap to see the sessions held that day and the insights extracted from them.
168 insights
16 Jul 2026
The committee scrutinised the UK’s resilience architecture, with the Security Minister and Cabinet Office official defending the current lead-department model while acknowledging it needs periodic adjustment after Covid. They set out planned work on a home defence programme, a national resilience communications campaign, cyber resilience measures for business, and the five-year review of the Civil Contingencies Act. The witnesses argued for cross-government and local empowerment rather than a single-purpose resilience minister or new agency, while also signalling possible legislative gaps around critical national infrastructure, private-sector behaviour, and defence readiness powers.
09 Jul 2026
The committee scrutinised how the UK’s resilience system should balance lead-government-department responsibility with stronger Cabinet Office coordination, and how local resilience forums, devolved administrations, voluntary groups and the private sector fit into that model. Witnesses from MHCLG and DCMS described funding, assurance and partnership arrangements for local resilience forums, VCS engagement, data-sharing on vulnerable people, and the use of training and exercises. The second panel debated whether the cyber action plan and cyber security and resilience Bill are sufficient, with broad concern that the private sector, testing, recovery, and Cabinet Office leadership are underplayed. There was also strong discussion of public communications, national service/resilience culture, and whether insurance and regulation should do more to drive preparedness.
02 Jul 2026
The committee examined UK national resilience across emergency services, local resilience forums, public preparedness and humanitarian response, then turned to health supply-chain resilience, medicines and devices manufacturing, pandemic preparedness, cyber risk, stockpiling and workforce flexibility. Witnesses argued for clearer national leadership, stronger statutory and funding support for local resilience structures, fuller inclusion of the voluntary sector, and better public education. On health security, they stressed dependence on global supply chains, the need for longer-term contracts, stockpiles and domestic manufacturing where feasible, and warned that future crises may be sustained or concurrent rather than a single peak. Several witnesses called for resilience to be made a top government priority and for better integration of day-to-day operations with crisis readiness.
25 Jun 2026
The committee examined how the UK should maintain resilience across communications, critical national infrastructure and transport under conditions of power loss, cyber attack, disinformation, climate stress and wider disruption. Witnesses stressed the BBC’s role in trusted emergency information, telecoms and rail resilience, the dependence on power and subsea cables, and the need for better cross-sector decision-making, stress-testing and funding. The main positions extracted were support for the BBC’s universal service role, calls for clearer government leadership on subsea cables and digital sovereignty, and evidence that rail, telecoms and water sectors are already planning but face ageing-assets and investment gaps.
18 Jun 2026
The committee scrutinised two linked dimensions of UK resilience: food security and private-sector preparedness. Witnesses argued that UK food supply chains are dangerously exposed to shocks, with calls for strategic stockpiles, a new food security and resilience Act, stronger ministerial leadership, regional food structures, and better public guidance. In the second panel, the focus shifted to climate, cyber and hybrid risk, where the witnesses said resilience is becoming an operational necessity but that current guidance and legal/regulatory frameworks are too weak, especially for SMEs, critical suppliers, and sectors outside finance and cyber. The key government positions extracted were that resilience frameworks exist but are not yet applied consistently to food; that regulation and public-private insurance partnerships can crowd in private capital; and that there is no current Treasury intention to expand Pool Re into cyber risk.
11 Jun 2026
The committee scrutinised how the public understand national risk, why trust in central institutions and government messaging is declining, and how resilience communications should be reshaped for fragmented audiences. Witnesses argued for more truthful, fact-led messaging, tailored by audience and delivered through indirect influence networks rather than only central government channels. The second panel focused on telecoms and cyber resilience, with Ofcom describing existing security frameworks, the coming Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, and the need for redundancy, incident reporting, and cross-sector planning. Witnesses also highlighted the importance of education, local/community preparedness, and building trust before crises hit.
16 Jul 2026
16 Jul 2026